This chapter provides a three-fold taxonomy for analysing other-centred work, distinguishing between work required to maintain primary care relations (love labour), secondary care relations (general care work) and tertiary care relations (solidary work). A central theme of the chapter is that primary care relations are not sustainable over time without love labour; that the realisation of love, as opposed to the declaration of love, requires work. 13 Drawing on a wide range of theoretical and empirical sources, including a study of caring undertaken by the authors, the chapter argues that there is mutuality, commitment, trust and responsibility at the heart of love labouring that makes it distinct from general care work and solidary work. It sets out reasons why it is not possible to commodify the feelings, intentions and commitments of love labourers by supplying them on a paid basis. The chapter also explores the scope and limitations of paying for secondary care work, and the ways in which solidarity can be both positively and negatively employed in terms of social justice.
2005; Pettinger et al., 2005) . It has been blind to the importance of othercentred work arising from our interdependencies and dependencies as affective, relational beings. In particular it has ignored the centrality of caring for the preservation and self actualisation of the human species. Yet, care labour produces social outcomes and takes at least three distinct forms, namely love labour, general care labour and solidary work. Primary care relations, in particular, are not sustainable over time without love labour, and the realisation of love, as opposed to the declaration of love, requires work. Love labouring is affectively-driven and involves at different times and to different degrees, emotional work, mental work, cognitive skills and physical work (the distinction between love labour, general care labour and solidary work is examined in detail below). Without such labouring, feelings of love or care for others can simply involve rhetorical functionings, words and talk that are declaratory in nature but lack substance in practice or action. Verbal utterances of affection, care or solidarity (which may be valuable in and of themselves) become empty forms of rhetoric when they are not complemented by undertakings on behalf of others. The rhetorical problem is not unique to primary care relations; it also arises in relation secondary care relations or solidary relations although these are not the primary focus of this chapter (see Moran, 2006 for a discussion of the use of social inclusion as a rhetorical device in the political sphere).
Caring is low status work generally undertaken by low status people, especially when it is engaged in full-time. In most countries, people who are working full-time as carers at home (mostly women) are not defined as working. Personal service workers, especially carers, are poorly paid and have low status. In the United States (in 2006) child care workers had a mean annual wage of $17,120 which was lower than that of cleaners and janitors at $19,750 or those employed in food preparation and serving related work at $19,690 (U.S. Department of Labor, 2007) . In Ireland, as in many other countries, care workers employed in the care sector have the same status as semi-skilled workers such as bar staff, goods porters and mail sorters, which is the second lowest occupational ranking. If care workers are employed in private households as domestic staff they are classified as unskilled workers and are at the bottom of the occupational ranking (Central Statistics Office, 2003) .
The low status and wages of full-time carers reflect the deep disrespect there is for caring in society. As we demonstrated in Chapter I, this lack of respect is reflected in the academy. Sociological, economic, legal and political thought has focused on the public sphere, the outer spaces of life, indifferent to the fact that none of these can function without the care institutions of society (Fineman, 2004) . Within classical economics in particular there has been a core assumption that the prototypical human being is a self-sufficient rational economic man (sic) (Folbre, 1994) . There has been no serious account taken of the reality of dependency for all human
